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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose: The objective of this research is to analyze the effect of corporate governance practices on 
firms’ financial performance, as measured by comprehensive income.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: Using a sample of 237 firms from the S&P 500 Index during the years 
2004 to 2009, multivariate statistical analyses are conducted in order to confirm our main hypothesis. 
 
Findings: The results indicate that having high levels of corporate governance culture has a positive 
impact on a measure of firms’ financial performance, namely comprehensive income. Furthermore, they 
indicate a positive correlation between the percentage of external directors and financial performance, 
and a negative relationship between number of board meetings and financial performance.  
 
Originality/value: The main contribution of this research is that good corporate governance strategies 
deliver superior financial performance for businesses in terms of comprehensive income. This serves as a 
method of value creation, which is the ultimate goal of a business. In addition to the use of comprehensive 
income as an indicator of financial performance, a unique measure of corporate governance level is 
tested. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance; financial performance, board of directors, outside directors, duality, 
board meetings, CEO compensation, comprehensive income. 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Research interest in the concept of ‘corporate governance’ has grown considerably over the past decade 
(Calderón and Villabón, 2017), particularly as a result of recent economic crises. Some studies suggest 
that high levels of corporate governance may reduce managers’ earnings manipulations and tendency to 
commit fraud; in addition, it may achieve a higher quality of information (Prior et al., 2008; Scholtens 
and Kang, 2012; Shi et al. 2017). Incidents of frauds are related to the boards of directors’ decisions, 
which are seen as the instrument used by shareholders to monitor the behaviour of top managers (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). However, actions intended to improve corporate governance have information-
processing and opportunity costs for firms; the questions then become, do these strategies have a positive 
impact on companies’ results, and do corporate governance strategies create value for companies? If the 
answers to these questions are ‘yes’, managers will need to invest in corporate governance. However, if 
the answers are ‘no’, managers will not need to develop corporate governance strategies. 
 
The origins of corporate governance go back many years, to the time when ownership and management of 
businesses first became separated in accordance with the agency theory. However, measuring, for 
example, the true independence of a board director is difficult because of the subjectivity and intangibility 
of this concept (Abdo, 2007). There are two main approaches to minimizing agency problems: improving 
corporate governance structure (Baek et al., 2009; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Patelli and Prencipe, 
2007; Valenti et al., 2011) and promoting greater transparency of information (Fernández-Rodríguez et 
al., 2004; Price et al., 2011). However, when considering the implementation of these approaches, both 
strategies should have a positive impact on financial performance; otherwise, there will be unnecessary 
costs. Prior studies have explored the effects of corporate governance measures on firm performance, 
although empirical findings are mixed (Sami et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2016). One reason for these 
inconclusive findings could be the use of different approaches to measuring corporate governance: Some 
authors have used composite measures of corporate governance as indexes, while others have used 
individual corporate governance attributes, such as board characteristics or ownership structure (Jackling 
and Johl, 2009; Klappers and Love, 2004; Richart-Ramón et al., 2011). However, specific corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as the size and composition of boards and leverage and firm size, tend to 
mitigate the occurrence of agency costs in the USA (Garanina and Kaikova, 2016). 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of firms’ corporate governance structures on their 
performance; this is done with the intention of reducing information asymmetry and assisting companies 
to achieve their central purpose, the creation of value. Using a sample of 237 companies (1,422 firm-year 
observations) listed on the Standards & Poor 500 index during the period between 2004 and 2009, we 
hypothesize that having high levels of corporate governance culture will have a positive impact on firms’ 
financial performance. The hypotheses are tested using general linear regression models. We develop our 
own index of corporate governance level, which takes into account the variables that have the greatest 
effect on the internal characteristics of boards of directors, in order to determine the corporate governance 
culture level of a company. Comprehensive income is more closely related to the fluctuation of share 
prices and exchange rates than traditional net income; thus, it is much more in accordance with the market 
reality (Arimany et al., 2011; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). 
Our main contribution is the evidence offered to support the notion that having a high level of corporate 
governance culture has a positive impact on a firm’s financial performance. This finding serves as an 
incentive for managers to develop superior corporate governance strategies, as doing so will have a 
positive impact on a firm’s profitability. In addition, the use of comprehensive income to measure 
accounting results could serve as a trustworthy broad indicator of the performance and corporate 
governance of a firm; it also takes into account not only economic profit but also the creation of value. To 
the best of our knowledge, no prior studies have used comprehensive income to measure firms’ 
performance. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, we present background research into corporate 
governance and the hypothesis. The third section provides an overview of the research design, including 
the details of the research sample and the methodology. Section four summarizes the findings; finally, we 
conclude this research by discussing its main implications and limitations. 
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2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
From the agency theory perspective, guidelines for the relationships between managers and owners are 
warranted; they should protect shareholders’ interests through implementing codes of good governance. 
The agency theory suggests that a better-governed firm should demonstrate superior performance due to 
lower agency costs (Rani et al., 2014; Sami et al., 2011). However, there is no consensus in the existing 
literature with regard to how corporate governance or performance outcomes should be measured. This 
topic is a central issue confronting corporate governance scholars, and there also remain intense areas of 
corporate governance research (Kumar and Zattoni, 2013). Many previous empirical studies, such as 
those of Gompers et al., (2003); Brown and Caylor, (2006, 2009); Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and 
others, support this link. However, measuring corporate governance is difficult because it cannot be 
directly observed, and it usually involves multiple dimensions (Sami et al., 2011). A common approach to 
measuring corporate governance is to create an index. The corporate governance indexes that have been 
used previously have either been developed by the research teams in question or generated by commercial 
firms. Despite their limitations, studies that use commercial ratings do not differ significantly from those 
that use self-constructed indexes in terms of the evidence produced, although commercial rankings “are 
often too subjective and, therefore, might lead to an incorrect assessment of a firm’s governance quality” 
(Bozec and Bozec 2012; p. 85). Additionally, one should take into account the different measures of 
financial performance (such as return on assets [ROA], return on equity [ROE], market value, Tobin’s Q, 
etc.) when investigating the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. This is 
why the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance is not clear; that is, a 
different way to measure for both variables. Some researchers obtained mixed results (Bebchuck et al., 
2009; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Chidambaran et al., 2008; Core et al., 2006) or no evidence of any effect 
(Daines et al., 2010; Epps and Cereola, 2008; Diavatopoulos and Fodor, 2016; Johnson et al., 2009; 
Koehn and Veng, 2005; Lehn et al., 2007); however, the majority of researchers have identified a positive 
correlation between corporate governance indexes and firm performance in the US, which is the focus of 
the sample used in this research. For instance, Gompers et al. (2003) created the G-index, which uses 24 
factors to measure corporate governance, including compensation plans, special meetings, voting and 
others. Their results indicate that, during the 1990s, better-governed US firms demonstrated higher 
operating performances (in terms of net profit margins and sales growth) but not higher ROE and higher 
firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q). However, Core et al. (2006) found the results of Gompers et al. 
concerning ROE to be inconsistent and argued that ROA serves as a superior measurement of operating 
performance; they found that the G-index is significantly related to this measurement of operating 
performance. Later, Brown and Caylor (2006) suggested that the inconsistent results of Gompers et al. 
(2003) and Core et al. (2006) were not due to the choice of operating performance measures but rather 
because of the manner in which the G-index was constructed. They claim that the majority of the factors 
included in the G-index are anti-takeover measures. Hence, they developed a broader index (using 51 
items) to achieve greater reliability. A number of characteristics of boards of directors were included, 
such as board size, number of outside directors, number of board meetings, CEO duality and board 
compensation. Their findings indicated that better-governed U.S. firms have higher ROE, higher ROA 
and higher Tobin’s q. Aggarwal et al. (2010) developed an index based on 64 provisions, grouped into the 
following eight categories: board of directors, charter/bylaws, state incorporation, compensation, 
progressive practices, ownership, director education, and audits. The application of this index identified a 
positive relationship with firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. However, Cheng and Wu (2006) 
only obtained positive results, measured in terms of stock returns, when the evidence was concentrated in 
large firms. 
Nowadays, corporate governance indexes are generally created with reference to a number of 
characteristics of boards of directors. Internal factors, such as board size, number of outside directors, 
CEO duality, number of board meetings and CEO compensation, are most commonly used in the 
literature. For this reason, our index is created using only the most commonly employed variables for 
measuring internal corporate governance. Thus, our hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis: Companies with high levels of corporate governance culture demonstrate superior 
performance. 
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In addition, we test whether there are differences in the results of hypothesis when using the index or its 
individual variables separately.  
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3. THE STUDY 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
We focus on a final sample of 237 non-financial companies (1,422 firm-year observations) listed on the 
S&P 500 index during the period between 2004 and 2009; in particular, we focus on the period of high 
market volatility that occurred as a result of the financial crisis. We only select companies that were listed 
on both the Spencer Stuart Index report and Compustat Database during these six years; this is done in 
order to determine if the mentioned volatility of market values may have distorted our measurement of 
firms’ performances, the comprehensive income. We eliminate financial firms due to their different 
structures and the roles of their accounts and boards of directors (Andrés et al., 2005; Sánchez-Ballesta 
and García-Meca, 2007; Yermack, 1996). The data is classified into eight sectors (consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, energy, healthcare, industrials, technology, materials and utilities), as in 
the Spencer Stuart Board Index reports (see Table 1).  
 
    Table 1 here 
 
3.2. Measures 
 
3.2.1. Corporate governance variables 
 
Following previous studies, we focus on aggregating corporate governance variables in an index (Beiner 
et al., 2006, Brown and Caylor, 2006; Campa and Donnelly, 2013; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and 
Love, 2004; and others). “The aggregate index of corporate governance remains a useful tool for 
continuing this line of research” (Love, 2010, p. 9). We attempt to improve upon the other indexes by 
being more concrete and precise; first, by selecting the most commonly used internal corporate 
governance variables (board size, outside directors, duality, board meetings and CEO compensation) and 
by excluding external variables, such as auditing committees, ownership structure, and others, that do not 
have any relation to board firms. Second, in order to generate a more precise index, board size and CEO 
compensation are related to company size. The corporate governance index is built as follows: 
 
CG_Index= (BoardSize) + (OutsideDirectors) + (Duality) + (BoardMeetings) + (CEOcompensation) 
 
The corporate governance variables are defined as follows:  
 
-‘BoardSize’ as the total number of directors divided by the logarithm of total equals 1; otherwise, it 
equals 0;  
-‘OutsideDirectors’ as the percentage of outside directors divided by the total number of directors. If the 
value of the outside directors variable is greater than 73.5 percent, then ‘OutsideDirectors’ equals 1; 
otherwise, it equals 0;  
-‘Duality’ as if CEO≠Chairman, then the variable ‘Duality’ equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0; 
-‘BoardMeetings’ is equal to 1 when the number of board meetings is between four assets. If board size is 
between nine and twelve directors1 (both inclusive), then the variable BoardSize and ten (both inclusive);2 
otherwise, it is 0; and 
-‘CEOcompensation’ represents CEO remuneration divided by the logarithm of assets. When this 
variable2 is between $122,567.29 and $318,075.74, then the variable ‘CEOcompensation’ equals 1; 
otherwise, it equals 0. 
 
As a result, the corporate governance index can have values ranging from 0 to 5. If a company has a value 
of 5, it indicates that the firm has a good level of corporate governance culture.2 
 
                                                          
1The intervals of the variable are calculated by the mean plus or minus the standard deviation as a way of considering 
the majority of firms.  
2Missing values of corporate governance index are set to zero (Huisman 2000). 
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All of these corporate governance variables were obtained from Spencer Stuart’s website, a publication of 
Spencer Stuart Consulting,3 while data concerning CEO duality were obtained from the firms’ annual 
reports.4 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2. Financial performance and control variables 
 
The majority of previous studies have used accounting profits such as ROA, ROE or net income in order 
to measure firms’ performance; however, due to accounting harmonization, comprehensive income value 
could represent the most appropriate approach to measuring profitability because it is more in accordance 
with the market (Arimany et al., 2011; Firescu, 2015; Kanagaretnam et al. 2009). Indeed, accounting 
results have greater relevance when they are associated with expected market prices (Barth et al., 2001). 
In this paper, we intend to determine which approach to measuring financial performance is more 
appropriate for our research proposal, taking into account that the specific period in question (2004-2009) 
experienced high levels of market volatility as a result of the financial crisis. All relevant information 
(including market value, total assets, ROA, ROE, net income and comprehensive income value) was 
obtained from the 2003 version of the Execucomp database. 
 
We also obtained the comprehensive income values of the firms on the database from their annual reports. 
Comprehensive income is “the change in equity [net assets] of a business enterprise during a period from 
transactions and other events and circumstances from non-owner sources. It includes all changes in equity 
during a period except those resulting from investments by owners and distributions to owners” (SFAS 
No. 130, 1997). Comprehensive income is the sum of net income and other items that must bypass the 
income statement because they have not yet been realized; this includes items such as unrealized holding 
results from securities that are available for sale and gains or losses incurred as a result of foreign 
currency transfers. Consequently, comprehensive income is more closely related to the fluctuation of 
share prices and exchange rates than traditional net income, and it is thus much more in line with the 
market reality (Arimany et al., 2011; Firescu, 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). Bamber et al. (2010) also 
note that CEOs whose jobs are less secure (when measured in terms of CEO duality and the number of 
outside director members) and offer greater equity-based incentives (CEO Compensation) are more likely 
to avoid performance reporting in a performance statement than in the statement of equity. This means 
that, according to their own interests, managers choose different ways of presenting information.  
 
As control variables, we use market value, sales, leverage and year dummies, as in previous studies 
(Beiner et al., 2006, Brown and Caylor, 2006; Campa and Donnelly, 2013; Klapper and Love, 2004; 
among others).  
 
We expect a positive effect about control variables related to size (market value and sales) because 
previous studies indicate that the larger the company, the greater its profitability (Beiner et al., 2006; 
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Klapper and Love, 2004). We also expect no effect with leverage (Beiner et al., 
2006).  
 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive variables and their sources about corporate governance variables and 
the control - dummy variables of sample firms (see Table 2). 
  
     Table 2 here 
 
3.3. Methodology 
 
Once the corporate governance index is built, the first hypothesis is tested, using comprehensive income 
(CI) as the dependent variable. We predict that companies with higher levels of corporate governance 
culture will have better outcomes, as expressed in the following hypothesis:  
                                                          
3http://www.spencerstuart.com/research/articles/ 
4Board size and CEO compensation are deflated by asset (Hall and Weiss 1967). 
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Hypothesis: Companies with a high level of corporate governance culture demonstrate superior 
performance. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate the following regression:  
 
Model A: CIit= βo+ β1(CG_Indexit)+ β2(MarketValueit)+ β3(Salesit)+ β4(Leverageit)+ β5(year2009it)+ 
β6(year2008it)+ β7(year2007it)+ β8(year2006it)+ β9(year2005it)+ εit 
 
Where the subscript i refers to the firm number and the subscript t denotes the time period; the dependent 
variable CIit is the comprehensive income value for firm i in time t; βo is a constant; β1 – β9 are the 
parameters for the explanatory variables; CG_Indexit refers to the corporate governance index; 
MarketValueit, Salesit, Leverageit, year2005it - year2009it are control and dummy variables; and (εit) is the 
error term. 
 
We predict a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of CG_Index, suggesting a strong 
relationship between a high comprehensive income and a high level of corporate governance culture. 
Then, model A is estimated using the three alternative dependent performance variables (ROA, ROE and 
net income), with the control and dummy variables included on the right-hand side. We wish to test if 
hypothesis 1 is positive and significant regardless of the financial performance variables used.  
According to the previous literature, hypothesis 1 will produce different results if an index or individual 
indicators of corporate governance are used. In model 1B, we intend to test whether the results obtained 
for model A remain the same when the five corporate variables, namely board size, number of outside 
directors, CEO duality, number of board meetings and CEO compensation, are used instead of an index. 
What impact does each variable have on financial performance? Will the same results be obtained using 
different measures of financial performance? We estimate the following regression:  
 
Model B: CIit = βo+ β1(BoardSizeit)+ β2(OutsideDirectorsit)+ β3(Dualityit)+ β4(BoardMeetingsit)+ 
β5(CEOcompensationit)+ β6(MarketValueit)+)+ β7(Salesit)+ β8(Leverageit)+ β9(year2009it)+ 
β10(year2008it)+ β11(year2007it)+ εit5 
 
Model B tests a linear regression between corporate governance variables or individual indicators and 
comprehensive income value. The subscript i refers to the firm number, while the subscript t denotes the 
time period; the dependent variable CIit is the comprehensive income value for firm i in time t; βo is a 
constant; β1 – β11 are the parameters for the explanatory variables; BoardSizeit, OutsideDirectorsit, 
Dualityit, BoardMeetingsit, CEOcompensationit refer to the variables belonging to the corporate 
governance index; MarketValueit, Salesit, Leverageit, year2007it - year2009it are the control and dummy 
variables; and (εit) is the error term. The control variables used are the same as in model A. 
 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
4.1Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
 
The final sample consisted of 237 companies (1,422 firm-year observations) that had been listed on 
the S&P 500 index during the period between 2004 and 2009. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics 
of all of the variables considered in this study: the corporate governance index, the five corporate 
governance variables (board size, number of outside directors, CEO duality, board meetings and CEO 
compensation), the four financial performance measures (ROA, ROE, comprehensive income and net 
income) and the control variables (market value, leverage and sales). On average, all of the variables 
considered in this study had a positive value (see Table 3). 
     Table 3 here 
                                                          
5There is no data for CEO composition in years 2005and 2006. 
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The corporate governance index mean is 3.05 out of 5, with a standard deviation of 0.94. Thus, the range 
of corporate governance index in our sample is between 2.11 and 3.99. This means that, on average, the 
firms in our sample demonstrate a high level of corporate governance culture. The fact that the sample 
firms are listed on the S&P 500 index is likely a guarantee of high levels of corporate governance. Other 
studies use different corporate governance variables in the index, but all of them obtain the same results: 
higher values on corporate governance indexes (i.e. Beiner et al., 2006, Brown and Caylor, 2006; Campa 
and Donnelly, 2013; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; among others). 
When analysing the corporate governance variables of the index separately, our results indicate that the 
median of the board size, the variable that is most frequently used in the literature to measure the 
effectiveness of corporate governance (Huse, 2000), has 10.63 members. In our research, the ideal 
number of directors is found to be between 8 and 12; our results are thus in line with the ranges 
determined in other studies, such as those of Campa and Donnelly (2013), Jensen (1993) and Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992), among others. The percentage of outside directors, considered to be “the crucial corporate 
governance mechanism for monitoring managers” (Bhagat et al., 2008), has a significant relationship to 
board size, as was the case in other studies (i.e.; Dalton et al., 2007; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Fogel and 
Geiger, 2007). The ideal average ratio of outside to total directors is upper 73.58 percent, as was found in 
previous studies (Matolcsy et al., 2004). 
According to the categorical variable “duality”, in our sample there were 1,201 firm-year observations 
that the CEO and the president were the same person, constituting 84.5 percent of the total sample. Our 
sample is biased in terms of this variable, but this is a common situation in real life. 
The number of meetings in our sample was, on average, 8 per year, with a high range of between 4.88 and 
11.12. This result is in line with other studies, such as those of Vafeas, (1999), who found a mean of 7 
meetings per year and a standard deviation of 2.66; Adams and Mehran (2008), with a mean of 8.48 
meetings and a standard deviation of 3.30; and Brick and Chidambaran (2010), with a mean of 7.2 
meetings per year and a deviation of 3.05. 
According to the board remuneration variable, our values were approximately between $22,567.29 and 
$318,075.74, showing a high dispersion. This also occurs with the control variable of market value: Its 
mean is $26,762 million, with a standard deviation of $46,941 million. The same high dispersion is 
demonstrated by the sales variable, with a mean of $26,937 and a standard deviation of $79,717.43. The 
leverage variable interval is between 0.78 and 2.64.  
Table 4 depicts the correlation matrix. There is a positive and high correlation between board size and 
outside directors (86 percent), in line with the findings of Matolcsy et al. (2004). This means that there is 
a high probability of having outside directors in large-sized boards, although this is not dependent on firm 
size. Logically, there is also a positive correlation between ROA and ROE (71 percent), as ROA 
conditions ROE. As net income is an element of comprehensive income, they are also highly correlated 
(93 percent). Finally, market value is also correlated with net income (89 percent), comprehensive income 
(85 percent) and with firm size (63 percent). This means that the higher the market value of a firm, the 
larger its size and the higher its financial performance (see Table 4).  
Table 4 here 
 
4.2 Regression analysis 
The regression analyses show the results of our models between corporate governance (disaggregating 
variables and aggregated in an index) and comprehensive income value. 
 
In model A, a linear relationship between the corporate governance index and comprehensive income 
value is tested. Table 5 presents the results of the regression. The null hypothesis could not be rejected at 
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a significance level of 10 percent (p-value=0.077), so the level of corporate governance culture has a 
positive impact on firm performance as measured by comprehensive income value. These results are in 
line with previous studies that have used other corporate governance indexes to obtain significant and 
positive values (Beiner et al., 2006, Brown and Caylor, 2006; Campa and Donnelly, 2013; Gompers et al., 
2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; among others). The control variable, the market value, a measurement of 
firm value, is positive and significant (0.000p value). This means that large companies demonstrate 
greater profitability, again in line with the findings of previous studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Brown and 
Caylor, 2006; Klapper and Love, 2004; among others) (see Table 5). 
 
    Table 5 here 
 
  
Regarding the year dummies, only β6 (-835.5) had a significant impact (p-value: 0.000), which indicates 
that, in 2008, net income was, on average, approximately $835 million lower than in 2004. This is 
obviously due to the negative effects of the economic crisis.  
The remaining control variables in model A (sales, leverage and year dummies) have no significant 
impact on firm performance. This means that revenue and debt structures do not affect the relationship 
between level of corporate governance culture and profitability. 
 
In model B (see Table 6), the corporate governance index is disaggregated in order to analyze how the 
five corporate governance variables impact financial performance. The results indicate that outside 
directors and board meetings cannot be rejected at a significance level of five percent (with p-values of 
0.017 and 0.014, respectively). Several studies support these results (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Luan and 
Tang, 2007; McDonald et al., 2008; O'Connell and Cramer, 2010; Peng, 2004; Rhoades et al., 2001). 
Having a higher percentage of outside directors and a lower number of board meetings has, on average, a 
positive impact on a firm’s performance. It is true that external directors are more likely to manage firms 
in a professional manner than dependent directors, as the former tend to apply their management 
knowledge and only take into account the firm’s best interests. Moreover, holding meetings leads to high 
costs for firms, so, if companies hold few meetings, they may be more efficient, which could have a 
positive impact on their performance. Indeed, new communication technologies and the Internet are 
improving the relationships between firms and their board members without the need for more board 
meetings (except when strictly necessary). Board size, duality and CEO compensation have no significant 
impact on firm performance in terms of the remaining variables (sales, leverage and year dummies, 
except year 2008). (see Table 6) 
 
 
     Table 6 here 
 
4.3 Robustness tests 
 
The accounting measures (ROA, ROE and net income) described below are used to test our robustness 
models, leading to quite different results. All of the models are estimated using the three alternative 
dependent performance variables (ROA, ROE and net income), with the control and dummy variables 
included on the right-hand side. Three regression models, using ROA, ROE and net income as dependent 
variables, are set up in order to determine the importance of these measurements of financial 
performance. The results are different, as seen below. Market value, sales, leverage and year dummies are 
included amongst the set of control variables in these models. 
 
The corporate governance index is positive with net income, negative with ROA and non-significant with 
ROE. This diversity of the results obtained in our study are in line with those of other authors, one group 
of which argues that “most governance studies are fraught with a variety of limitations, including 
inconsistent measurement of performance, differing governance standards worldwide and the additional 
impact of contextual factors” (Dalton et al., 1998).  
The results obtained depend on the measure of profitability used, as shown in Table 7, below. 
     Table 7 here 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The objective of this paper was to analyze the effect of corporate governance strategies on a measure of 
firms’ financial performance, the comprehensive income. The previous literature indicates that the effects 
of corporate governance on financial performance are not conclusive, but, in the majority of cases, the 
results are significant and positive. Our corporate governance index is more concrete and precise than 
others because we selected the most intrinsic corporate governance variables and excluded external 
variables, such as auditing committees, ownership structure, and others, that do not have any relationship 
to board firms. The process by which financial performance is measured is also more robust because it 
has an impact on value creation. 
Our results support the notion that a potential method by which firms’ boards could achieve greater 
profitability or otherwise enhance firms’ value is the application of superior corporate governance 
strategies. In this research, this was demonstrated using a sample of 237 firms listed on the S&P 500 
Index during the years between 2004 and 2009. This means that corporate governance practices are 
considered to be a source of competitive advantage for firms that incorporate these practices in their core 
business strategies (Gómez and Ucieda, 2013). 
When we disaggregated the corporate governance index, the results indicated a positive correlation 
between the percentage of outside directors and financial performance and a negative one between the 
number of board meetings and financial performance. However, no significant correlations were found 
between board size, duality, CEO compensation and financial performance. This finding is relevant for 
boards of directors because they should be aware that a higher number of outside directors and lower 
numbers of board meetings may result in superior financial performance and increased firm value. 
Additionally, stakeholders may ask the management of firms to adopt corporate governance practices, as 
doing so will have positive effects on comprehensive income, and, consequently, firms’ value creation.  
 
This study has some limitations, which may also represent avenues for future research. First, the small 
size of the sample and the limited period of time considered may also explain the absence of support for 
some of our hypotheses; no significant correlations were found between board size, duality, CEO 
compensation and financial performance. Second, our corporate governance index could be created with a 
greater number of, or different, variables; we used a narrow scope, focusing on the corporate governance 
variables commonly used in research in this field. 
 
Future studies are required in order to expand upon the scope of this research; for example, future work 
may consider how transparency and corporate governance variables impact firms’ performance or how a 
firm’s internal governance structure impacts its financial performance, as it can be in Spain, such as 
Rodriguez-Fernandez (2014). Our study contributes to the extant literature in the area of corporate 
governance and suggests other possible approaches to measuring a firm’s performance. Companies 
nowadays could create a firm’s value better than more profitability goals. 
 
